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NUISANCE ABATEMENT:
USE OF THE COMPARATIVE
INJURY DOCTRINE
In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., eight adjacent property owners
brought an action based in "servitude on land"'2 alleging that dust
and noise emanating from the defendant's cement plant and blasting
operations damaged their property. Plaintiffs sought damages and
asked that defendant be permanently enjoined from engaging in its
operations. The trial court found that defendant's operations consti-
tuted a nuisance and that the plaintiffs had been substantially dam-
aged. Upon such findings, the court allowed temporary damages for
the injuries caused up to the time of the litigation but refused to
grant an injunction due to the great disparity between the economic
positions of the parties.3 The court also found that the defendant
maintained the most modern pollution-abatement devices available
at the time of the litigation.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New York reversed and re-
manded with directions to grant the injunction conditioned on pay-
ment of permanent damages.4
Referring to their order allowing the conditional injunction, the
court stated that although the real damage resulted from air pollution,
the court had only limited power to grant relief. Thus the court
denied an unconditional injunction, reasoning that:
It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private
litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public ob-jectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court.5
The remedy in New York for a nuisance which causes substantial
damage has traditionally been an unconditional injunction.6 But the
1. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970).
2. Id. at-, 257 N.B.2d at 875.
3. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 873. The plant and quarry operation constitute a
$45 million investment and employ over 300 people.
4. Id. at-, 257 N.E.2d at 875.
5. Id. at-, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
6. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 872, citing Whalen v. Union Paper Bag Co., 208
N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913), which authorized permanent damages as a con-
dition to an injunction for a found nuisance where not "unsubstantial" damage
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Boomer court refused to issue such an order because it felt the plant
should not be closed down, and it therefore crystallized the available
alternatives as: (1) allowing the injunction to become effective at a
future date during which time the defendant could develop the
requisite technical expertise and voluntarily abate the nuisance,
or (2) allowing the nuisance to continue by conditioning the injunc-
tion on payment of permanent damages.7
In choosing the latter alternative, the court emphasized that the
development of more efficient technical abatement procedures is the
burden of the entire cement industry and that it would be unjust to
penalize this one plant if "due regard be given to equitable princi-
ples."$ In support of this position the majority cited a number of
cases in which an injunction conditioned on payment of permanent
damages was awarded for a found, substantially injurious, nuisance.9
However, the dissent pointed out that these cases can readily be dis-
tinguished on the ground that they involved a public benefit and that
the present case dealt exclusively with private litigants. Further-
more, the majority went on to say that the permanent damages they
awarded would preclude further recovery and that all monies paid
would be compensation for such servitude on land."'
This court's holding, although a departure from established New
York precedent, is consistent with the majority of courts which have
allowed private air polluters to continue in their operations so long
as the pollution is not unreasonable or unnecessary. This result has
been accomplished by applying the doctrine of comparative injury.
The doctrine, used as a judicial test, attempts to weigh the relative
hardships accruing to the alleged polluter on the one hand and the
is found. The court there enjoined a million dollar pulp mill employing 4500
persons which wilfully polluted plaintiff, a lower riparian farmer, causing $100
damage per year to the farm land.
7. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 874.
8. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 873.
9. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 874, citing: Kentucky Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling,
264 Ky. 470, 95 S.W.2d 1 (1936); Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. W.J.
& M.S. Vesey, 210 Ind. 338, 200 N.E. 620 (1936); City of Amarillo v. Ware,
120 Tex. 456, 40 S.W.2d 57 (1931); Pappenheim v. Metropolitan El. Ry.
Co., 128 N.Y. 436, 28 N.E. 518 (1891); Lynch v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 129
N.Y. 274, 29 N.E. 315 (1891); Westphal v. City of New York, 177 N.Y. 140,
69 N.E. 369 (1904).
10. 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
11. Id. at -, 257 N.E.2d at 875.
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individual plaintiffs on the other.12 For example, in a leading Tennes-
see case, Madison v. Ducktown Sulfur & Iron Co.,1 3 property owners
having aggregate valued property of $1,000 brought an action in
nuisance for damages suffered as a result of the pollutive effects of
defendant's $2 million mining operation. Plaintiffs alleged that the
pollution caused by defendant made it impossible for them to raise
crops. The court found for the defendant and denied the injunction
by reasoning that greater hardship would result from shutting down
the operation of the mine. The Madison holding apparently repre-
sents the majority position.1 4
Although Boomer is consistent with the majority of courts deciding
similar cases, a growing number of courts have questioned the validity
of the comparative injury doctrine and have awarded equitable relief
to adjacent landowners, 5 even to the extent of prohibiting the entire
operation. A leading case is Hulbert v. California Portland Cement
Co.17 where the owners of an $80,000 cement plant moved to stay an
injunction against their operation by posting a bond for the full
value of plaintiffs' property damaged by the plant's cement dust. In
denying the motion, the Supreme Court of California stated: "[W]here
the acts of a party, whether individuals or corporations, wealthy or
poor, destroy the substance of complainant's estate, whether it be of
great or of but little value, an injunction should be issued." 18 And
in response to the defendant's comparative injury argument to stay
the injunction, the court commented:
[ e cannot, under plain principles of equity, compel these plain-
tiffs to have recourse to their action at law only and take from
12. Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private
Rights, 1967 DuKa L.J. 1126. See generally Hansen v. Independent School Dist.
No. 1, 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959 (1940); Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131
Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924); Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 148
Tex. 509, 226 S.W.2d 615 (1950); Hatch v. W.S. Hatch Co., 3 Utah 2d 295,
283 P.2d 217 (1955); Fraser v. City of Portland, 81 Ore. 92, 158 P. 514 (1916);
York v. Stallings, 217 Ore. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959).
13. 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
14. Juergensmeyer, supra note 12.
15. See Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, 214 P.2d 50 (1950); Schlotfelt
v. Vinton Farmers' Supply Co., 252 Iowa 1102, 109 N.W.2d 695 (1961);
Hawarden v. Betz, 182 Iowa 808, 164 N.W. 775 (1917); Guttinger v. Calaveros
Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 383, 233 P.2d 914 (1951).
16. See Crushed Stone Co. v. Moore, 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962).
17. 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
18. Id. at 250, 118 P. at 932, quoting with approval the dissenting opinion in
Mountain Copper Co. v. United States, 142 F. 625 (9th Cir. 1906).
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them the benefit of the injunctive relief accorded them by the
chancellor below. To permit the cement company to continue its
operations, even to the extent of destroying the property of the
two plaintiffs and requiring payment of the full value thereof,
would be, in effect, allowing the seizure of private property for a
use other than a public one-something unheard of and totally
unauthorized in the law.",
In accord with the above reasoning and after distinguishing the
majority's supportive case law as based on broad public benefit ration-
ales, the dissent in Boomer stated that the effect of the majority's
holding was to allow a type of "inverse condemnation," which is per-
missible only when the public is served in the taking or impairment
of property.2 0 The opinion continued: "Nor is it constitutionally
permissible to impose servitude on land, without consent of the owner,
by payment of permanent damages where the continuing impairment
of the land is for a private use." 2 1
Several cases support the dissent's position. In Crushed Stone Co. v.
Moorej 2 after finding that over $13,000 had been expended in im-
provements, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the operation
of a quarry constituted a nuisance and granted an injunction despite
the disparity in economic consequences to the parties. And in an
Ohio decision 23 involving a found nuisance resulting from quarry
operations, the court granted an unconditional injunction stating:
This rule of law is obviously based upon the theory that an
invasion of the rights of an owner of real estate by interfering
with his enjoyment thereof, through an explosion, either by
throwing missiles upon it or by concussion, is as much a trespass
as wrongfully going upon it, and, as a continuing trespass may
always be enjoined, hence continued wrongs of the character
claimed by plaintiffs would be such an invasion of their rights by
the defendant as would warrant equitable relief by way of injunc-
tion.24
19. Id. at 245, 118 P. at 930.
20. See generally Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540
(1964). The Martin opinion states: "Inverse condemnation is the popular de-
scription of an action brought against a governmental entity having the power
of eminent domain to recover the value of property which has been appropriated
in fact, but with no formal exercise of the power." Id. at 310 & n. 1, 391 P.2d
at 542 & n. 1.
21. 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
22. 369 P.2d 811 (Okla. 1962). Accord, Weaver v. Yoder, 89 Ohio L. Abs.
402, 184 N.E.2d 622 (C.P. of Tuscarawas County 1961).
23. Heilman v. France Stone Co., 20 Ohio App. 261, 51 N.E. 798 (1925).
24. Id. at 263, 51 N.E. at 799.
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In Mclvor v. Mercer-Frasher Co., 25 although the court granted dam-
ages to adjacent property owner plaintiffs against the defendant quarry
operator, it refuted a defense based on the comparative injury doctrine
with the following:
If appellant's theory were sound, one who coveted his neighbor's
property could force a sale of the same by the simple expedient
of injuring such property or impairing the enjoyment thereof and
cause the owner to sell or forego all right to damages by tendering
to the owner the cost of said property to him or the market value
thereof. This of course cannot be the law.2 6
The doctrine of comparative injury is accepted in some jurisdictions
and denied in others. It is a difficult doctrine to apply rationally,
because insofar as the plaintiff is denied a decree enjoining an actual
nuisance, the defendant in effect is given an easement over plaintiff's
land. This amounts to a taking of property for private use in viola-
tion of established constitutional principles. 27 Where the defendant
is required to pay plaintiff the reasonable value of his property, or
the interest therein which is injured, the effect is condemnation for
the benefit of a private industrial plant, which does not possess the
power of eminent domain.28 Arguably, the taking could be justified,
consistent with established constitutional tenets, by characterizing the
industrial plant as quasi-public for purposes of awarding equitable
relief insofar as its vital societal contribution pervades individual
enterprise. However, such a characterization of private business as
quasi-public for purposes of condemnation would create myriad prob-
lems, and it would allow any industrial polluter to continue its harm-
ful operations by paying the plaintiff the value of his property.
The use of the comparative injury doctrine is justified in cases of se-
vere environmental effect only when the general health hazard is fac-
tored into the balancing formula along with the economic conse-
quences of an injunction on the operations of private enterprise. As
the majority in Boomer suggests, resolution of the total problem of
25. 76 Cal. App. 2d 247, 172 P.2d 758 (1946).
26. Id. at 251-52, 172 P.2d at 761.
27. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment states that a state
cannot deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Due process, within the context of this comment, would require that any inter-
ference with the use or enjoyment of a person's property against his will to the
extent that it constitutes a taking be authorized and reasonable. See Hulbert v.
California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
28. Kennedy & Porter, Air Pollution: Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L.
Rv. 854 (1955).
Washington University Open Scholarship
NUISANCE ABATEMENT
environmental purity is beyond the competence of private litigation,
but courts, as forums of objective fact-finding and resolution of dis-
putes, can provide necessary leadership toward promoting the indi-
vidual responsibility of business and industry with regard to the
pollutive effects of their operation. Failure to respond to this responsi-
bility and further compounding the problem should not be the re-
sponse of the courts.
Finally, the instant case is unfortunate in that it fails to conform to
recognized jurisdictional precedent and, more importantly, because
it disregards the irreversible effects of air pollution, especially the type
which produces the greatest hazard to human health 29-that which
results from cement plant and blasting operations.
Michael S. Maram
29. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d at -, 257 N.E.2d at 875
(1970).
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